For the GGU-model, What is Specific Information,
Instruction-information and Their Relation to
Our Physical World?

Robert A. Herrmann Ph.D.
12 OCT 2002. Last revision 13 SEP 2016.

[Note: I am changing customary practice. In writing scientific articles not written by Joe Smith, the customary practice is to write "Joe Smith discovered such and such." If the author of the article has made a discovery, the author usually expresses this as "Such and such was discovered" and a reference is given that implies that the author of the article is the discoverer. When appropriate, I no longer follow this practice. This is not done to be boastful. It is done to be immediately truthful. I will often express my thoughts in an informal manner. Prior to the references is a special e-mail address for significant questions.]

Via the concepts of "information," the following is established.

The General Grand Unification Model (GGU-model) shows that the definition of Nature includes that, in all respects, it behaves like an intelligent agent. Feynman calls Nature a "She." That is "She does stuff." Relative to our intuitive concept of what "intelligent" actions produce, Nature displays such intelligent actions. The actions follow patterns that our brains can replicate, via general descriptions, and these patterns can be specifically described in terms of specific logical steps termed as classical logic. The existence of these patterns is defined as the secular notion of intelligent design in that physical objects are designed in a special manner so that their behavior as a physical-system follows fixed humanly comprehensible describable laws. It is these patterns that are for Nature the essence of intelligent design. A preponderance of evidence, indeed every physical thing that exists and every alteration in physical behavior, establishes that Nature has these properties. (Note: For this article the GGU-model signifies the "complete" GGU-model.)

The same evidence indirectly establishes that such "intelligent" behavior is the restriction of the behavior of a GGU-model predicted higher-form of intelligence. No evidence has been shown that counters this statement. Additional characterizations for this higher-form of intelligence depends upon other factors such as historical documentation produced prior to the GGU-model disclosures, personal experiences or philosophic stances. The idea that "if the characteristics of something - "A" are essentially the same as the characteristics of a specific something, then "A" is that specific something.

The Historical Facts.

In 1977-78, there was considerable popular discussion of the concept then called "subliminal perception." During the summer of 1978, I got an idea. Could I model, via languages and mental images, properties of subliminal perception? Such perception is useless unless it also carries the notion that what is perceived is "meaningful." The idea is to use how we logically present meaningful language descriptions and images as described by notions taken from mathematical logic. Assuming that subliminal perception is fact, I concluded that whatever these mental responses are they need to follow the same patterns. But, then I was sidetracked by a lunch-hour study a few faculty members and I were having on the writings of C. S. Lewis. This lead to the GD-(Grundlegend-Deductive) model, that I use to model the strength of comparative human attributes. In 1979, after a conversation with John A. Wheeler, I introduced the GGU-model under a different name. It's based upon ideas taken from the GD-model and additional concepts that, at that time, didn't correspond to meaningful terminology.

After many years of effort, terminology, diagrams and other modes of illustration have been developed and these have the potential of greatly improving the comprehension, by others, of the original ideas. All of these ideas were independently developed. I had no additional knowledge as to how "thoughts and the mind" were discussed by others. This all changed in 2004. I read a paper on the subject of "thoughts" that discussed the ideas of Eccles an Robinson. I acquired a copy of their book that presents their own conclusions as they correspond to Descartes, Popper and others. It was then that I began to re-describe the GGU-model using their ideas for "thoughts" and my previous notion of "specific information." However, the basic procedures have not changed. The concepts are still modeled in the same way as those used for the GD-model via a standard language model embedded into a nonstandard structure. In all cases, it always begins with a model for how we logically apply a general language in order to rationally convey our thoughts. The GGU-model, in its complete form, is based upon a model for observable human behavior.

In mathematical logic, patterns of symbols represent or model how we deduce conclusions and other mental procedures. The physical part of brain activity is not investigated, only the input and output represented by strings of symbols. The properties that are modeled mathematically and that describe the behavior of the categories of specific information as presented below remain the accepted logical patterns displayed, via languages and images, that in themselves are but a model for other physical brain activity. However, the standard symbol strings take on addition content, they are "meaningful" in that they lead to physical actions.

As defined below the mathematically predicted *instruction-information model displays, at least, patterns of an higher-form of intelligent agency and design. At least, two of these, the intelligent design of physical laws and their intelligent application, are directly observable in restricted form.

Over the past few years, I've come to realize that what was almost exclusively an exercise in interpreting new mathematical results in terms that yield the GGU-model, actually correspond, in extended form, to human behavior. Since that time, I've been incorporating these facts within my writings on this subject. I now do so for three related notions of "information" - information viewed as a scientific notion.

Often, scientists hid behind code words. The behavior that corresponds to a code word is described. Then better terminology that describes the entity, terminology that immediately implies the author's actual intent, is left for the reader to "deduce." This is prevalent when various forms of "information" are discussed. In this article, I no longer follow this practice. My use of the term "preponderance" means "a numerical amount of." For observable physical processes and not observable processes, if these produce characteristics for something - "A" such that there is a preponderance of observable evidence that the characteristics are essentially the same as for "a specific something," then the produced A is that "specific something." Further, if the processes essentially behave like or characterize "something," then they are that "something." I use the term "essentially" to indicate that, for direct and indirect verification, the observable evidence satisfies a specific list of characteristics. I make the reasonable assumption that actual observations between individuals can vary somewhat.

For indirect evidence, suppose that more than one "something" is proposed and each yields the same preponderance of observable physical evidence that essentially characterizes the same predicted "specific something." Then a choice needs to be made as to which "something" one accepts based upon other "non-scientific" considerations.

In mathematics, a theorem that has been "proved" remains a "correct" statement unless an actual error can be shown in the proof or an explicit counterexample stated. I extend this to the scientific method since so much of science depends upon mathematics. Any statement I make for which there is a preponderance of evidence remains valid unless refuted. To be refuted, an explicit error in the logical argument used most be explicitly stated and, hence, established. Or, actual evidence is shown to exist in physical reality that counters my statement. Or, for a statement that is but indirectly verifiable, a greater amount of evidence is shown explicitly to counter my statement.

I won't consider, under any condition, inane statements made by others, that "We will find a counterexample" or "There should be evidence that counters the statement using such and such" or "Such and such evidence 'seems to,' 'could,' 'looks like it might,' 'might' counter your statement," and, the like. I'll ignore any form of intimidation.

There exists a rather vague notion we term "thoughts." I do not mean by the term thoughts, which we mentally "hear" or images we mentally "see." These I term "physical thoughts" (P-thoughts). In one direction (A), so to speak, it's a vague "feeling" that we "know" something but can't, as yet, express it in a form so as to communicate it to others. Then comes the search for a language, for diagrams, etc., - a description - that invokes something similar in the "mind(s)`" of others. But, what is it that is invoked? Just what is the mind? Here is a little diagram for the process. These are not P-thoughts, but, in all cases, the "Descriptions" are physical. (I shortly adjoin to such thoughts the notion that leads to descriptions that have "meaning"to others.)

(i) Thoughts(A) => Description(A)

Going in the opposite direction, more or less, there is a type of converse to this that we experience throughout our lives. (B) You are presented with words or diagrams that claim to represent a concept. You consider more and more descriptive content. Suddenly, you might utter "Oh! I see. I understand." This is a moment of "a ha!" What does one mean by "I understand"? (A rhetorical question, I suppose. By-the-way, if you have read any of my material of the present type, you surely have noticed that I repeat a lot of notions but, hopefully, in rather different ways.)

Description(B) => a ah!

Once you have such a moment of a ha!, then this can lead directly to physical actions that might indicate, to others, that you do, indeed, comprehend. Or, you might say, "I guess this is what you mean." You speak or write done additional descriptions in the hopes that the one who presented you with the new concept will agree that the concept has the properties you state. The moment of a ha! takes place after you have "thought" about the matter. What you appear to be doing is going from "thoughts" back to descriptions. Or

(ii) Description(B) => Thoughts(B) => Description(C) => Thoughts(C). . .

Then the individual who has the original thoughts says, "Yes, I think you have the idea." Is this diagrammed process (ii) reasonable? I think so.

Importantly, individuals can use entirely different languages, compose descriptions for thoughts and, only after these descriptions are formally stated, is it shown that the descriptions are equivalent.

Are the above set of diagrams as descriptive as they might be? No, since an important term is missing. It's a term that corresponds to that vague notion of "comprehension." The thoughts are not just random noise. So, let's coin a term for this. Call it "intrinsic comprehension," a hidden type of comprehension.

The term "intrinsic comprehension" means, at the least, the mental awareness that one internally comprehends a thought so as to produce a description. Or, a description produces an internally comprehended thought. Actually, the terms "thoughts" and "intrinsic comprehension" should be intuitively understood and should not be considered as mere terms that have completely equivalent dictionary definitions.

Let's use the phrase "meaningful thought" for the notion of a thought coupled with intrinsic comprehension. Thus, let's alter the previous diagrams.

(I) Meaningful Thoughts(A) => Description(A)

(II) Description(B) => Meaningful Thoughts(B) => Description(C) => Meaningful Thoughts(C) . . . (if necessary).

Many years after the GGU-model and its GID-model interpretation were first conceived and originally developed, the following quote, attributed to Hermann Weyl, was discovered.

Is it conceivable that immaterial factors having the nature of images, ideas, 'building plains' also intervene in the evolution of the world as a whole?"

My answer to this question is, yes! Notice that "images, ideas, 'building plains' " can be generally classified as "thoughts." (I wonder if Weyl actually intends the reader to also state "Yes.") The facts are that comprehension of certain GGU-model processes and entities is only possible when an appropriate "mental-like" language is employed. I may mention this fact more than once. There are others who have more recently acknowledged this meaningful thoughts notion.

The concept of "thoughts" can be understood via examples. I think in words expressed by my mental "voice." These words are not produced via my audio channels that correspond to processes that lead to the physical hearing of sounds. Then I think in mental images. These do not correspond to the physical process of vision. I can overlap within my mind visual impressions with mentally generated images. All of this is obvious. Others have recently described a meaningful thoughts notion. Nobel Laurent John Eccles and N. Robinson do so.

"One feature of linguistic expression is rarely considered in depth. We can all recognize that when we are attempting to express subtle thoughts, particularly those that are novel and as yet unclear, we may tentatively try now this, now that verbal expression. In fact this is precisely what is done in writing this section. In attempting to convey some experience it is difficult to give satisfactory verbal expression to one's thoughts. One searches for the right words and syntactic arrangement so that one can have hope that one's thoughts may achieve a clear expression to listeners or readers" (Eccles, Robinson, p. 117).

[This is the exact reason why it is difficult to convey, in this article, what I intuitively know. It will take considerable time to construct detailed descriptions or illustrations for my thoughts on the next subject - instruction-information.]

Eccles and Robinson are concerned with the "thoughts" concept and our experiences. These thoughts, as just described, take place in "another place" other than our presently defined materialistic world. The most important evidence for the existence of such thoughts lies in the region of "creativity." That is, subtle thoughts that are concerned with new, creative, or novel concepts that have not been presented to others. Thoughts that often require the development of new words, new strings of symbols, new language elements, new illustrations in order to convey the thoughts to others. This vague "thoughts" notion is extendable to musical composition and artists presentations as well.1 (Superscripts indicate note at the end this article.)

To counter these last statements, it's not enough to simply locate a region of the brain that does react during experiments cited by Eccles and Robinson. It must also be established, via actual evidence, that this reaction is directly related to these thoughts. It cannot be a matter of a mere philosophic stance.

Such thinking is, at least, composed of entities that are not the actual linguistic items nor the images we use to convey these thoughts to others. Is there an Eccles and Robinson immaterial "medium," that has an interface, where the combination of thoughts and intrinsic comprehension is transferred back-and-forth across the mind-brain interface? The Eccles and Robinson form of information satisfies a restricted information-to-material and material-to-information pattern. Portions of a general description generate thoughts or thoughts generate portions of a description. (Apparently, for Eccles and Robinson, "material" means what are the accepted entities or processes listed as physical by science-communities.)

"The essential feature of these theories [dualist-interaction] is that the mind and brain are independent entities, the brain being in World 1 [physical objects] and mind in World 2 [various Popper defined immaterial notions] and that somehow they interact, as diagrammed in Figure 3-1, and across this frontier there is interaction in both directions, which can be conceived of as a flow of information, . . . ." (Eccles and Robinson, p. 35).

Below are examples A - D that, I hope, clarify my intent. BUT, here is an explicit illustration which I consider, for me, the most significant.

THE Illustration.

I've revised this article many, many times over the past years. Why? I have been experiencing, numerously many times, what I've experienced literally thousands of times in the past. How do I describe this "something" that occurs? I have this great image and mental sound memory. I know absolutely the difference between these two and a third "something" that occurs. I "know" the difference between these two and audio channel sounds and visual sensory inputs, assuming it's shown I'm not hallucinating. Yet, something, probably more significant, continues to occur.

I am working on a mathematical or physical theory. A combination of symbols suddenly "pops" into my conscious brain. I write it down. I state, "That looks correct." I know that I know that it's correct. I also know that I don't know how to prove it so. I also know from my experiences that some-how-or-other I will, may I use the term, unconsciously work on the proof. On a few occasions, hours, days, and even months pass. My brain is highly active on other matters, doing all of the thousands and thousands of things it does in my daily course of events. I am totally unaware of any brain activity going on relative to "proving" this statement. Then, often when I least expect it, "suddenly," as they say out-of-the-blue, my mental voice explicity states something or a mental image occurs relative to the proof or derivation. I then write down what the voice has said or draw a picture of the image and that leads me directly to a proof or derivation.

This process I've just described occurs for other ideas not associated with a mathematics proof or a scientific disclosure. Indeed, it has occurred many, many times since I started revising this article. It occured early in the early morning of 5 FEB 2013 and at later times and what I'm attempted to express in these paragraphs are the results. I've apparently been "thinking" that I need to find as many ways as possible to illustrate the idea of intrinsic comprehension, the idea that one knows "something" but cannot as yet express it in any conscience form. And, I've also been "thinking" of the approach I'll use. What I've just written, in these last three paragraphs, is the result of these hidden thoughts and intrinsic comprehension that I've just attempted to describe via strings of symbols. For me, there is a preponderance of evidence that there is a difference between the physical brain and this aspect of what many call a mind.

So, I've these "meaningful thoughts" and they have led to the above actions I've taken. At present, this is the best description I can give relative to my own experiences. Am I going to revise this article again to express more meaningful thoughts? Probably. (Like today 12 SEP 2016.)

Many different individuals using many different languages can observe the same physical event. They describe, in their own language, their sensory-produced observations. Their comprehension is based upon the meanings they mentally associate with these different descriptions. Then each can draw a representation of the event and the representations are essentially identical.

Physical science applied throughout the world depends upon having a fixed mental meaning for language described sensory-impressions. Physical science also depends upon our imagination, which then leads to descriptions. In this context, a "meaning" needs to be, some-how-or-other, unique. "Specific information" applies to this unique feature and the fact that behavior and specific entities are being described by a meaningful language, a meaningful mental correspondence, mentally conceived diagrams or images. From the viewpoint of specific information, information-unique descriptions are "equivalent." Hence, specific information needs to be considered as something other than the symbols within any language. Descriptions that are meaningful to the mind (or brain) possess "the same something" as represented by each language dependent description. This "something" is a form of specific information. It is the mental - the thoughts form - that also can direct a human's construction of described physical entities.

(SI) There is often great confusion between the categories of specific information and representations for it, such as codes and other symbolic forms. Specific information, in all cases, is distinct from these representations. Information "informs." But, specific information has an additional feature. It includes the notion of verb "to form." The term "specific" means that when an entity or process is obtained it corresponds to a specifically defined entity or process. Specific information is operative in character. That is, it is information used "to form physical or physical-like entities or produce behavior." It refers to the "general idea." Whether the meanings of the terms used directs one to a definable purpose depends upon the interpretation.

For most applications to our physical world, instruction-information is the operational content of specific information. Instructions can be coded expressions for regulations, laws, processes that include entities, and the like. Actually, a general language can be considered a code. On the other hand, it can be but a bunch of alphabet letters or numbers that correspond to other stuff. ("Instructions" terminology is also used in biology.) Different languages express, in written form, sets of equivalent instructions that yield the exact same actions and products. Described physical laws can be considered as producing describable alterations in physical behavior and, hence, they can yield instructions. Hence, there is "information," "specific information" and, the last step, "instruction-information."

**** There is a preponderance of (indirect, at the least,) evidence that shows that, for human behavior, meaningful thoughts and a medium exist. Properties of humanly expressed languages are used to model "thought" properties. The meaningful thoughts and medium concept associated with human behavior is generalized to the GGU-model and, hence, a model for Nature. For the GGU-model, the term "instructions" is modeled by a collection of entities taken from a language and that invoke "meaningful" thoughts. The term "meaningful" signifies that instructions lead to consistent actions. Indeed, specific GGU-model instruction-entities yield the final action, which is a form of counting.

It's a remarkable fact that for thousands of years the Hebrew rûwach often translated as the soul or spirit of man, also refers to the mind and thoughts. Indeed, such a spirit is the origin of mental actions, the origin of our thoughts.. For the GGU-model, such thoughts are relative to GGU-model processes and these actions produce a physical universe and sustain its development. Actions can be explicitly modeled by the behavior of biological creatures. The expression "instruction-information" is characterized or modeled by the above notion of meaningful thoughts relative to us with an additional component - a "medium." It is the presence of a specific type of medium that expands the concept of meaningful instructions. I repeat, that, for our use, instruction-information needs to be understood as meaningful thoughts and an associated medium as here described. (The medium notion is an added feature upon which the GGU-model is not dependent.)****

Following my expressed desire to be truthful as to intent,

instruction-information IS composed of meaningful thoughts and now includes an additional component - a medium. I won't inquire into any possible "stuff" of which such "thoughts" are composed. In the same manner as most members of the particle physics community consider quantum fields, I consider such meaningful thoughts as a primitive.

Does such a medium really need to exist? Eccles and Robinson are concerned with the brain (the material part) and aspects of the mind (the immaterial part) and experiments that appear to justify this dualist-interaction hypothesis. They cite laboratory experiments, which lead to indirect evidence that a medium exists. They consider a specific "mental-to-information" activity. From this view, information "flows" into and out of the material brain as well as into and out of the immaterial mind and this form of information is not a physical brain entity. The Eccles and Robinson medium has properties. It transforms meaningful thoughts into human physical actions. Choosing the medium as an immaterial non-physical or immaterial physical entity needs to be based upon other considerations. Considering a primitive such as the quantum field as an immaterial yet physical medium is a philosophic choice.

As indicated, specific instructions used to obtain a specific entity are represented in many different languages. For instructions, intrinsic comprehension is considered as language independent. There is a preponderance of evidence that instructions written in different languages lead to the construction of the exact same entities or the exact same observed behavior, and the instructions are not obtained via translations although they are judged as identical when translated. The same holds for some independently obtained physical laws that are described in different languages and that yield the exact same physical behavior, where, when translated, the descriptions are judged as having identical meanings.

A basic problem in modeling is whether the postulated objects actually exist or are they merely being used to model behavior, behavior that we may not be able to otherwise comprehend. Is there personal evidence that instruction-information, via symbolic representation and a medium, can actually be directly identified with an entity or is it only a modeling notion?

As an example, suppose that you are assembling a new piece of furniture. A set of instructions is part of the material sent. Hopefully, the instructions have meaning for you. Your mind or brain notes that certain tools are called for. Using them and the instructions, you should be able to connect the pieces. That is, except for instruction 9. You don't know what instruction 9 means. You "think" about it for a few minutes. Suddenly the meaning "pops" into your brain and you continue the assembly process.

What is there about instruction 9 that allows for this sudden mental realization? From the Eccles and Robinson viewpoint, it's the "information" being presented by instruction 9 that your mind uses to develop a conscious meaning that your hands can duplicate. And, there is a medium that aids in the transition of this "information."

As mentioned, whatever the instructions are conveying to your mind, instructions for constructing the same piece of furniture but written in another language should convey to the mind the same "instruction-information" so that others can properly build the same piece of furniture. This is a simple illustration of how instructions are applied by us to construct objects.

In industry today, there is the industrial robot. A computer program composed of written symbols is translated into electrical impulses, the robot complies with these impulses and constructs an object. But, the robot is not a physical primitive. Can we perceive physical primitives? Is a single neutron observable via human sensors? Via machines, it is claimed that a single photon's presence can be detected. Technically, to have one joule of energy, a single photon needs a frequency of 1.51 x 1033 cycles/sec.

Consider a six-step scheme A. (1) A set of instructions is written. Each is written in a "code" composed of symbols or diagrams. (2) The instructions are presented to an individual. (3) The individual reads the code and corresponds the code to meaningful thoughts. (4) Via electro-chemical processes, an Eccles and Robinson medium transforms the intrinsically comprehended thoughts so as to influence other human physical locations exterior to the brain. (5) At these physical locations actions are taken. (6) The actions produce a physical entity that corresponds to the original instructions.

"Immaterial" aspects of scheme A are described in step (3) and (4). On the other hand, an individual has meaningful thoughts and then, using (4), attempts to give a coded representation for the meaningful thoughts that will yield the same intrinsic comprehension and thus convey the same meaningful thoughts to others as illustrated by scheme (I).

Consider scheme B. A telescope is positioned to image the planet Mars. (1) At various moments in increasing time, for each observation of Mars, the telescope's position is carefully noted. (2) Kepler considers this position data-set. (3) Kepler reads the numerical symbols and corresponds them to meaningful thoughts. (4) Via electro-chemical processes, the medium transforms the meaningful thoughts so as to influence other human physical locations exterior to the brain. (5) At these physical locations actions are taken. (6) The actions yield a collection of symbols or diagrams.

The symbols or diagrams Kepler writes down are his three planetary laws of motion. These apparently have never been so expressed prior to Kepler doing so. He now, for the planet Mars, uses these laws of motion and meaningful thoughts to predict another numerical data-set relative to the same telescope location, data that have not as yet been measured. At the predicted time, the predicted numerical values allow for aligning the telescope and Mars is viewed. Thus Kepler is said to have verified his discovered Laws of Nature. But, these coded statements and the data-sets do not appear in the physical world on their own. The coded laws are not produced by any physical process external to the human being. (Below, more is stated about this fact.) The laws are coded representations for behavior that we may not be able to otherwise comprehend.

Consider scheme C. (1) Kepler has written his set of three laws. (2) Newton considers the three Kepler coded statements. (3) Newton reads the symbol-strings and, via electro-chemical means, these correspond to meaningful thoughts. (4) New meaningful thoughts occur and, via electro-chemical processes, the medium transforms these meaningful thoughts so as to influence other human physical locations exterior to the brain. (5) At these physical locations actions are taken. (6) The actions produce a physical entity, a written symbolic form, that corresponds to a collection of coded symbols that yields Newton's law of gravity for circular orbits.

After many years, Newton continues step (3) and generalizes his "law of nature" to all planetary orbits and the forces between all bodies that have mass. Once again, this is a written representation for physical behavior, a representation for behavior that is not otherwise physically displayed. However, in so doing, he discovers that, in general, Kepler's third law is incorrect. "The squares of the periodic times T of the several planets is proportional to the cubes of their mean distance from the Sun." Newton postulates that not only does the Sun attract a planet but the planet attracts the Sun. One needs to take into account the mass of the Sun S and mass of the planet M. For two planets M, M' the correct expression is (T)2(S + M) : (T')2(S + M') = r3 : (r')3.] The Kepler guess that seems to satisfy the data-set does so only as an approximation since the Sun is so massive compared to the planets and the ratio (S +M)/(S + M') is nearly 1.

The conclusions of Kepler's second law are not directly observable. Nature does not display, in any form, the numerical areas for humanly constructed configurations in space. Indeed, the configurations require a construction that dose not physically appear except as represented by line segments not relative to any other physical entities except the Sun and a planet.

For much of modern physical science, the following scheme holds. (D) (1) A not as yet expressed idea seems to be developing within ones thoughts. (2) Suddenly one mentally states "Imagine that every point in space is also a point within some primitive stuff. Let's endow this stuff with certain properties expressed in symbolic form. The properties correspond to those considered in quantum theory. Let's call this a quantum field." (This is scheme (I).) These mental statements are not just mental "noise" but (3) meaningful thoughts that occur. Then (4), via electro-chemical processes, the medium transforms the meaningful thoughts so as to influence other human physical locations exterior to the brain. (5) At these physical locations actions are taken. (6) The actions produce a physical entity, a written symbolic form for the mentally stated idea. This leads to further deductions that describe observable physical behavior.

The (D) description satisfies the usual procedures that yield theoretical predictions based upon imagined entities. However, what usually starts as imagined entities are considered as physically real by various science-communities. A few other scientists considered them as imaginary, where they are but used as models for behavior we cannot otherwise comprehend.

In these schemes, there are symbolic codes. And, mental comprehension or awareness occurs. In each case, similar steps occur during the entire process. Eccles and Robinson give evidence for certain types of thoughts that have an immaterial component - their medium - and its relation to meaningful thoughts. Popper and others consider meaningful thoughts and, from the viewpoint of a sense of awareness, they are assumed to be immaterial in nature. In what follows, the two "M"s mean "medium." Scheme (V), (VI), (VII) are significant, where (V), (VI) and (VII) are based upon indirect evidence. The "actions" in (III) and (IV) are meaningful descriptions that are always physically expressible. (But, see the note after (VIII) below.)

(III) Meaningful P-thoughts <= M => Descriptions.

(IV) Logical Patterns for Meaningful P-thoughts <= M =>Logical Patterns for Descriptions.

(V) Meaningful thoughts <= M' => Descriptions.

(VI) Logical Patterns of Meaningful thoughts <=>Logical Patterns for Descriptions.

For all the actual applications of the GGU-model to physical events, the following are the schemes. The "descriptions" are abstracted and, hence, need not be physical. But, whatever they are, they have the same general properties as physical descriptions. In discussing the following notions on specific information, the schemes (VII) and (VIII) are always assumed. However, I usually won't mention to which scheme a particular discussion applies. Note that "Descriptions" are from a general language.

(VII) Descriptions, M''<=>Meaningful thoughts, M''' => Events.

(VIII) Logical Patterns for Descriptions, M''<=>Logical Patterns for Meaningful thoughts, M''' => Logical Patterns for Events.

NOTE: The substratum "Descriptions, M''<=>" and, hence, "Logical Patterns for Descriptions, M''<=>" need not exist in any reality. The existence of "Descriptions" or "Logical Patterns for Descriptions" is interpretation dependent. They need only be "representations" for the "stuff" on the right of <=>, as previously emphasized. Further, the same holds for (III), (IV) and (V). I don't follow that methods used by others who attempt to force upon individuals the reality of the "code" notation.

Relative to symbolic representations for a physical law, the Noble Laurent Richard Feynman makes the following statement.

The . . . reason that you might not understand what I am telling you is, while I am describing how Nature works, you won't understand why Nature works that way. But, you see, nobody understand that. (1985, p. 10)

The first part of this Feynman statement is false. Many scientists make such false statements maybe through pride or to enhance the public's view of their endeavors.

NATURE. The sum total of all things in time and space; the entire physical universe." (Webster's Unabridged Dictionary.)

For scientific logic, the word "all" [resp. "entire"] must be qualified in order for this definition to have any logical "truth value." This is done by adding the term "things" [resp. physical universe] to the definition. We are dealing with "human logical procedures." Hence, to have any truth value, there, at least, must be a possible list of terms that name items called "things." These "things" would include general biological items. The list usually includes all the defined physical entities.

But, are physical laws "things" that are included in the list? Are general statements about how the laws behave when viewed from another perspectives members of the list of "things"? I point out that mathematics technically only involves strings of symbols, rules for their formation and manipulation. Certainly written or printed strings of symbols are "things" that could be part of this list. Except that none that has not been created by us has ever been found. The physical laws don't on their own produce meaningful strings of symbols. So, without us or other such intelligent beings being present such strings of symbols have never been observed to exist within observable time and space. I don't believe that since they would need to be observable that a scientist would actually include strings symbols in the list called "Nature."

Again, it is important to note that the idea that "if the characteristics of something - "A" are essentially the same as the characteristics of a specific something, then "A" is that specific something" is rather general statement since the term "characteristics" can mean many different things, physical to conceptual to ? The characterizing factors should be carefully described.

When the term Nature is used, many other scientists and I mean a more general concept that includes the above definition as a restriction to defined physical entities and processes. It includes other properties that can be philosophic in character. One can understand how this term is being employed by carefully considering the context. Often it is a code word for behavior that occurs, behavior that is simply not assigned any further content.
If all we have is what Feynman states, then we don't know how Nature works under the dictionary definition. Feynman uses a stopwatch, he draws little arrows and adjoins them at end points and mathematical symbols are written down. He can then predict that a "counter" will click approximately a calculated number of times over a fixed period of atomic-clock time. Prior to anyone ever symbolically describing this theory, the "clicks" of the counter may occur. There is "nothing" observable within Nature that corresponds to his symbolic description, the stopwatch, drawn arrows, the mathematics, etc. For a secularist, mysterious Nature is certainly doing something but his symbolic way of representing what pure Nature is physically doing does not independently appear within Nature.

What Feynman is describing is but a model that predicts behavior. So, I suppose that he would include such models as part of his definition for Nature. This is an example of where a term can be confusing unless the context is carefully considered.

Later, Feynman further details his proposal and introduces the notion of "virtual" photons. These entities do not independently indicate their existence either before or after an experiment and they interact with other particles in a way that, technically, is but partially described. The procedures that are then used to predict observable behavior don't appear in Nature.

Trivially, Nature does NOT present physical laws in the forms we express them. The human mind and brain have produced descriptions termed physical laws. I repeat the fact that, for proper comprehension of physical science, it is trivial to state that we represent physical laws via symbolic forms that do not independently appear within Nature. They are products of our brain and mind. Certain stated physical laws can be replaced with other statements and both collections of statements predict the same observational behavior. One assumption scientists most often make is "There exists comprehensible physical laws that do depict the entities and processes that produce physical events." But, how is this all possible within "pure" Nature if there is nothing within "pure" Nature that somehow-or-other relates to how we describe its behavior? Is this question even answerable or must any correlation remain a mystery?

Before continuing, I must, as it always seems necessary to do, stress the major differences between the various models I present. These are supposed to be understood from the onset, but often are not. In what follows, the "developmental paradigm model" always means "descriptions" taken from an actual language L. In all cases when applied to Nature, they are NOT the physical objects they describe. The logical processes described by using a language are NOT the actual processes being described. So, what do these descriptions mean?

They are "representations" for "things," for the items in the list entitled NATURE as well as relations between these things. For the GGU-model, how members of L logically relate are employed. The term "logically" means that explicit rules for combining the strings of symbols are used. And, obtaining strings of symbols from lists of other strings of symbols is used. As is easily shown, these language stated logical processes mimic relations between items in the list NATURE. Other models I use and that are members of the GGU-model should be understood in a different manner.

Is there more independent evidence for the existence of the instruction-information medium than there is evidence for the existence of quantum fields? The A - D illustrations give evidence. Indeed, over time, trillions, trillions and trillions of these experiences and other cited examples give evidence for the existence of the Eccles and Robinson medium. Can we as human beings escape from this evidence? No, as long as we think and have vague "feelings" of comprehension and that such comprehension is transformed into any aspect of physical reality.

All of the predicted results attributed to quantum fields can be attributed to entities termed "propertons." Although it is predicted mathematically that other fundamental primitive entities do exist that relate to such a mental non-physical Eccles and Robinson medium, these entities are not propertons or any combination there of. The properties possessed by such a medium are not those properties solely represented by a finished product such as combinations of propertons. (I describe propertons, in more detail, elsewhere and add just a little more about them below. Distinct from such things as quantum fields or "strings," at least, one type is predicted to exist.)

For the GGU-model medium, properties are predicted and described by "hyperfinite instructions" or "hyper-laws" that have no meaning in any standard language used to expressed physical laws. Many can be stated and have full or partial meaning outside of a standard language in what is called the "meta-world." This particular "meta-world" includes the world of symbols and concepts used by mathematicians who work with a specific set of nonstandard models and a specially defined vocabulary. The terminology used describes a "subquantum region," or "a background universe," or "a substratum world" that produces and upholds a physical universe. It includes the standard world. That is, the physical universe and how it is described. One meta-world hyperfinite instruction is a statement on page 7 of Herrmann (2011).

I discovered (Herrmann, (1979)) how to take standard strings of symbols and imbed them into a mathematical structure (theory) in such a way that the mathematics itself "writes" (i.e. predicts) new strings of symbols that, at least, partially, have meaning for the standard world but have complete meaning for those in the meta-world. I repeat that the new results are predicted and are not hypothesized in any manner for any GGU-model purposes. For example, consider the set of statements

W = {There|||are|||n'|||ultra-propertons|||combined|||

where ||| denotes a space and n' is a symbol representing a natural number. To obtain the set, n' varies over the set of natural number symbols. (This uses notions from mathematic logic, where constructed or informally accepted "potentially" infinite alphabet-sets are employed.) The string of symbols "ultra-propertons" and "properton" although members of a standard language have no standard physical meaning. When mathematically modeled, the following statement is predicted.

W' = There|||are|||       |||ultra-propertons|||combined|||

In the meta-world, the strings of symbols "ultra-propertons" and "properton" have meaning. Then it is predicted that the blank space corresponds to a symbol in a predicted set of entities. These entities have meta-world properties that are not standard physical world properties. One simply selects a symbol to represent this missing symbol and this completes the meaningful meta-world statement. This hyperfinite instruction is now meta-world comprehensible. A general analysis of such statements, predicts that there are other hyperfinite instructions that are "meaningful" in an "higher" sense but they can neither be comprehended from the standard nor meta-worlds.

Please notice this very important fact. In both philosophy and physical science, hypothetical entities or processes are considered. From these, deductions are made. The deductions may be predictions and these predictions may be verified. This process is not used for the GGU-model predictions. The above hyperfinite instruction and all other such predictions are obtained mathematically and, although not originally done this way, they follow from actual observable evidence that is accepted as fact. For the above standard example, it is fact that what is written is a set of specific symbols that includes what most humans can do. We can, at the least, conceptually conceive making the necessary and continued substitutions of new symbols, such as 2', 3', etc. in the appropriate place in the above set-generating expression.

What else do we do with physical law statements?

The Basic Physical Behavior Principle (1). How Nature appears to combine physical laws to produce the moment-to-moment "evolution" (i.e. development or changes in the behavior) of a physical system follows (i.e. is mirrored, mimicked, imitated by) certain aspects of human mental activity.

It's trivial to demonstrated that the logic employed follows specific deductive patterns as we sequentially express the accepted physical laws, the coded representations for them, and predict behavior. This verifies Principle (1). But, does Nature really do the same sort of thing? Or, should we simply consider this yet another mystery that has no further explanation?

Besides Eccles, it appears to another Noble Laurent that there is a relation between the "mind" and the physical world exterior to the mind.

"The structure of the material universe has something in common with the laws that govern the working of the human mind." Louis De Broglie (March, 1963, p. 143)

What we perceive as physical laws are expressed as word-descriptions or diagrams and, when applied, are instructions. The development of a universe is claimed to "follow" these expressible instructions. "Something" external to these instructions "forces" physical or physical-like reality to conform to them. What is it? Can a relation between humanly produced descriptions for physical laws and humanly produced deductions that lead to observable physical reality and "processes," of some sort, within Nature be totally rejected? Of course it can. But, without philosophic bias, is it reasonable to reject such a relation as not existing?

Using the scientific process of generalization as used throughout all of science, the Eccles and Robinson medium is generalized and extend to a non-physical instruction-information medium. This medium mimics the process of transforming meaning thoughts as modeled by descriptions, via instructions, into physical reality. But, in this case, the reality can be physical, physical-like or something else entirely. Further, meaningful thoughts are extended to *meaning *thoughts. (Theologically and by comparison, when considered the Spirit (rûach) of God, then, among numerously other characteristics, the Spirit should be considered as the origin of His *mental *actions (Herrmann, 2013).)

More formally, for the GGU-model, a "something" of this type is termed as hyperfinite instruction-information, where this is a form of a "higher" instruction-information predicted by the properties of instruction-information as here defined. It is best understood only by its behavioral properties. When restricted to physical entities, it corresponds to "instruction-information" as previously defined.

Importantly, the properties of the instruction-information medium are modeled by the behavior of the codes that correspond to meaningful instructions and a model for Principle (1). The original developmental paradigm corresponds to "building plans." And instruction-information and hyperfinite instruction-information correspond to "ideas," (i.e. "thoughts") that correspond to these building plans. Hence, Weyl's speculation holds.

As is well known, Shannon information is not "information" in the sense of being meaningful. It refers to statistical notions relative to communicating strings of symbols. His form of "information" is independent from any "meanings" for such strings of symbols. "Physical information" is defined to be a complete description for a physical-system that is claimed to be language independent. It "completely" distinguishes one physical-system from another. For quantum information, there are two forms. One form is the classical form that is defined as the "complete" state vector for a physical-system. Why? Because, they can attach a number N to the complete set of quantum states and do a little mathematics. The other form uses the concept of the "qubit." These notions of information are based upon the verb "to inform."

(II) In summary, for the GGU-model, specific information is based upon the concept - "to give form to a specific entity or behavior. For each specific member of a development paradigm (an ordered collection of symbolic descriptions or images or even all aspects of human sensors effects), the "instruction-information" concept adds to the description this additional feature - "instructions" that given actual physical form to the description. This is the reason instructions are significant. The mathematics predicts the existence of hyperfinite developmental paradigms and hyperfinite instruction-information. The general behavior of hyperfinite instruction-information is predicted by the behavior of standard instructions and how meaningful thoughts lead to specific actions. Hyperfinite instruction-information yields the hyperfinite rationally designed and produced hyperfinite instruction-information model, which includes *meaningful *thoughts, a medium, the actions, info-fields and realization. (The * can be translated as "hyper" or simple pronounced as "star.")

The "hyperfinite developmental paradigm-information model," as hyperfinite rationally designed, is the hyperfinite developmental paradigm descriptions viewed as *meaningful *thoughts. As described next, it's the hyperfinite instruction-information that yields physical or physical-like reality or possibly some other reality, realities that correspond directly to each member of a hyperfinite developmental paradigm descriptions.

An hyperfinite instruction-entity is the set of operative hyperfinite instructions (i.e. substratum-type regulations) that yield appropriate gatherings of ultra-propertons, intermediate propertons, etc., which form physical entities. Portions of an hyperfinite instruction-set correspond to entirely describable standard instructions that can be fully comprehend. On the other hand, portions of hyperfinite instruction-set that correspond to a pure hyper-language, correspond to unknown constituents that yield physical-like entities and behavior. Hyperfinite instruction-information directly correlates to actual "stuff" - the info-fields - that is further detailed below. Pure hyperfinite instruction-information corresponds to unknown constituents within these fields.

Thus, hyperfinite instruction-entities and the additional required hyperfinite instruction-information form the actual operational content that yields the physical or physical-like specific part of hyperfinite specific information. Whether one considers hyperfinite instruction-information as a necessary requirement sequentially present prior to obtaining an info-field is relative to the interpretation. Info-fields have properties and these described properties are consistent with describable hyperfinite instruction-information. Without considering any additional details, hyperfinite instruction-information can represent info-fields. Hyperfinite instruction-information is not the info-field itself.

Most mathematical models for physical behavior model properties. They often represent notions that do not actually appear in the physical-world. That is, "Nature" neither stamps the properties nor parameter values on the objects themselves so that the properties or values are directly observed. In most applied cases, mathematics deals with symbols that "represent" physical properties but the symbols themselves are not the actual properties. Is there an actual something in Nature we call momentum? Newton defines this property, a property no one can actually observe. All we observe is motion, as expressed by a speed statement. This concept is associated with the moving entities mass. One wonders how he could have ever gotten the idea in the first place.

Indeed, it's almost beyond belief that Newton takes the product of these two numbers and considers the result as significant. Well, the law that momentum is conserved is exceptionally significant. From the behavior of a moving object, momentum allows us to deduce Newton's Second Law of Motion. Then through mental activity, this conservation property and Second Law allow us to describe or predict other behavior. Indeed, F = ma is a major fact in predicting numerously highly significant human physical endeavors. Other animals on planet earth neither seem to have such mental abilities nor apparently do they need such knowledge.

For the secular view, the notion of physical information having any relation to intrinsic comprehension is not mentioned. But, as I'll show, secularists can still employ all of the basic GGU-model processes. But, would they ever consider doing so? An evolutionary view is that what we classify as physical laws are merely human mental constructs that allow us to describe in various ways observed and either accepted or merely imagined entities and their behavior. For most secularists, these mental abilities have evolved as our brain and its abilities to observe and imagine have ("some-how-or-other") evolved. (This is a typical secularist's statement that is not verified by any evidence and, indeed, can be shown relative to evolutionary time-frames to be false.)

In basic mathematical logic studies, the symbols themselves are independent from any meanings one might apply to the symbols. But the symbols studied can be interpreted in various applied and physical ways. As far as I can determine, the General Grand Unification Model (GGU-model) is an highly significant mathematical model that predicts physical behavior and, although not originally presented that way, it can be mathematically deduced from observed physical objects and observed behavior. The term is "observed" behavior, not imagined behavior. This physical "stuff" is "represented" by members of a broadly defined "language" and various operators that, in restricted form, are exemplified by human activities, activities that must be the product of human thought processes. This is not the case with Quantum Theory.

Technically, two different notions are used. The first notion is a meaningful sensory-related (general) description while the second is the actual physical event that corresponds to the description. (The term "description" always means a general description as used for the developmental paradigm notion.)

For the physical world, a general description is a representation for a physical event. Such representations use language, images and sensory data. This language is denoted by L. Members of L form members of a developmental paradigm. For an individual, a description evokes mental or sensory impressions. A physical event is a physical form, a pattern, a physical phenomenon, a "real" physical object or system in the sense that it either yields human or machine sensory-impressions or is accepted to exist by a science-community. For the GGU-model, a particular general description employing L is considered to correspond to a particular (physical) event.

For much of modern physical science as well as the GGU-model, one needs to always keep in mind the following fact, which I repeat. In the vast majority of cases, the descriptive symbolic codes merely represent entities and behavior that we may not be able to otherwise comprehend. For certain aspects of a physical law or theory including the GGU-model, whether symbolized entities or behavior exist in some form of reality is a personal choice. Aspects can be pure imagination or accepted as based upon personal evidence.

The basic relation between hyperfinite instruction-information and info-fields.

The term "carries" is used a lot in particle physics rather than stating that a field contains stuff the behaves in a certain way. Often one reads that particles also "carry" properties. This avoids the "contains" notion for a primitive or does it? They often imagine "ripples" or things like that as occuring "within" a quantum field. I guess this is okay if you don't need to think of a ripple as composed of stuff that ripples. In fact, one might assume that the medium is not as primitive as thought and that it's composed of "stuff."

For the GGU-model, the numbers i and j in the symbolic form (i,j) represent moments during the development of a universe. Each corresponds to a "complete slice" of a universe - a universe-wide frozen-frame (UWFF). This is not difficult to comprehend today. Just consider a single frame, as a monitor displays it, when one pauses a DVD. Since particle physicists accept that there are distinct fields for each elementary particle, and there could be many more of these than listed today, why not let there be a medium for each (i,j). Indeed, call it the (i,j)-medium.

Next let's use some symbols as abbreviations for stuff that has a more detailed definition. An "info-field" uses predicted ultra-propertons and is composed of "bound" collections of ultra-propertons, called "intermediate propertons." Then bound collections of intermediate propertons, then bound collections of these, then bound collections of what results from this, etc. until the necessary bound collections are obtained.

For each (i,j), the hyperfinite instruction-information medium "carries" an entity F(q,r)(i,j). Now to obtain an "(i,j)-info-field" (or simply an info-field) here is what happens. There is this process, denoted by *A', that takes the F(q,r)(i,j) and breaks it into pieces. Depending upon ones interpretation, the operator *A' can be considered as exterior to the medium or that the medium carries this operator. In either case, the effects are the same.

The process *A' behaves in an unusual way. The process *A' follows the same pattern we use when we hear or see expressions from which we some-how-or-other deduce other expressions in a "specific order." However, *A' does it a lot faster and yields *instructions. The part we can comprehend states how "many" ultra-propertons are combined to produce a, not yet realized, physical characteristic. (Have you notice that I now use "positive" and "affirmative" style statements here, like they do in much of secular science, where this method gives the impression that what they state is "absolutely" true in reality, when usually this cannot be so affirmed.) Important note. Propertons should never be imagined as some sort of stuff. They are only "knowable" via their mathematical representation.

So, there is a process *A' associated with the hyperfinite instruction-information medium that when applied to "something1" produces "something2" in "deductive order" - an order that corresponds to a sequence of moments in the primitive sequence. The process behaves exactly like a higher-form of "deductive thought." Due to the characteristics of the "something1," unless otherwise established, "something1" is a mode of higher-thought. (Humans can argue via different modes of thought. This is modeled by the mode of thought we use in scientific discourse.)
I hope what you just read is clear and states my actual intent, no code words, no guessing. Now, what is the next step?

Such illustrations A - D are abstracted in order to obtain GGU-model "info-fields." Their relation to hyperfinite instruction-information can be model via human behavior. Each info-field is operationally obtained by the actions of a medium process symbolized by the operator G(q,r). Symbolizing actions by an operator is a standard procedure within mathematical modeling and the physical sciences. Hyperfinite instruction-entities guide the operator G(q,r) and the result is an info-field. Intuitively, G(q,r) transforms each specific hyperfinite instruction-entity into bound collections. This is exactly the same as how secular scientist formally apply some physical laws.

Operators often represent described physical processes and the behavior of these physical-law derived processes transform, some-how-or-other, one event into another. And, as with physical laws, the hyperfinite instructions that do this can actually be stated in meta-world comprehensible statements such as the previously displayed W'.

The hyperfinite instruction-entities always contain the members of the instruction-entities. These characterize the standard physical-system produced, if any. These can include standard language statements that deal with the complexity of a physical-systems and other specific descriptive aspects. Many hyperfinite instruction-entities are predicted. For physical-systems, these yield combinations of ultra-propertons. These are members of the non-physical info-field. The field contains other stuff as well. The info-field does not "carry" this stuff. It is composed of the collection of all of the necessary collections, within collections, within collections etc. and other stuff that can only be described via a higher-language.

Some hyperfinite instruction-entities yield physical-like systems. Entities from which they are obtained are termed as "unknown to us" although they are members of an info-field. Although it's predicted that this stuff has characteristics, the characteristics cannot be known by us, in that we cannot comprehend the language in which the characteristics are expressed. This includes the fact that we can neither "read" nor comprehended them even within the meta-world. However, these are predicted to produce members of an info-field. Depending upon the interpretation, for some, what actually exists need only be info-fields or only hyperfinite instruction-information-sets and they yield info-fields or only hyperfinite instruction-information. Based upon evidence, I consider hyperfinite instruction-information to exist and they yield info-fields, which also exist.

Quantum fields are postulated and their properties yield material particles. The operative content of specific information, hyperfinite instruction-information, is predicted from the properties of instruction-information. Info-fields are predicted and are composed of properton combinations. (Propertons are more formally defined in this glossary and mathematically described in Herrmann (2011).) When these combinations are realized in our physical world, their formation satisfies what we comprehend as physical laws. Info-fields carry additional properties. Specific purposes, other than the mere formation of physical entities, can be assigned to specific information. The "purposeful" concept is a viable interpretation and the GGU-model upholds this additional feature. From the date of this article, anywhere within this website the properties and relations between instructions, instruction-information and info-fields will be as here described.

As a model for behavior, instructions can first be expressed in a general language. Within the substratum, the operational content, the hyperfinite instruction-information, yields physical or physical-like behavior. The behavior of hyperfinite instruction-information, as revealed by mathematical analysis, has features that display thought-like actions taken by a higher-intelligence. And yes, you can ignore this additional analysis.

By-the-way, in quantum field theory, there is a physical process for "pair annihilation." An electron-positron pair, somehow-or-other, are no longer manifested and two photons suddenly appear. That is, the electron and positron characteristics disappear and photon properties appear. When asked "how does this happen," many physicists would state that it is the "quantum field law of nature that allows this to occur and nothing else needs to be known about the process." But, one may ask, "Isn't there something, a process say, that changes the electron-positron pair into the photons? Yes. Propertons that comprise the electron and positron are recombined, via portions of hyperfinite alteration-information (described below), to produce the photon characteristics. The same question can be asked no matter where one stops in a reductionist view. What, if anything, "forces" proposed elementary building blocks to follow the rules of Nature?

Secular science doesn't explain what "forces" an electron-positron pair to behave as it does. "It's just a physical law," we are told. Of course, this tells us nothing. Why don't secularists admit that they just don't know any more? (I won't discuss "string" notions. Any interacting collection of assumed elementary particles suffers from the same secular lack of knowledge.)

One of the important aspects of the GGU-model is that it predicts that there can be numerously many processes and entities in the substratum or background universe that we cannot describe using a human language. We simply know that they exist and a predicted language-like item, we cannot but partially comprehend, if at all, describes them.
Theologically, additional mental-like language is employed. Propertons are "commanded" to form into specific groupings. This is modeled by the properties of *A' and the medium associated with hyperfinite instruction-information as here defined. The notion of the "hyperfinite logic-system" (Herrmann, 2004) is employed as a step for this hyperfinite instruction-information approach. Since this type of information corresponds to specific language described instructions, then, for comprehension, the instruction-information properties are modeled by a specific language.

For the secular world, all that one can state is that there are processes that force propertons to take on the appropriate configurations. As pointed out later, info-fields can be used as the basic entities for the secular GGU-model. But, info-fields carry the additional feature of being directly associated with hyperfinite mental behavior, which, similar to the requirements of quantum logic, is ignored for the secular interpretation. Of course, propertons can be replaced with other hypothesized elementary entities. Obviously, for the theological interpretation, the "stuff" that corresponds to hyperfinite instruction-information is "higher-thoughts." Why? Because that's how it behaves.

As noted, symbols are said to represent "processes." Other symbols represent the objects to which the processes apply. Depending upon the tools one uses, each (general) description, (denoted by) f is directly associated with instructions I(i,j), and a medium process, as represented by G(q,r)(i,j), yields the required properton combinations or other unknown constituents. (The behavior of the "gathering" operator G(q,r)(i,j) actually determines another relation that specifically yields a signature for an higher-intelligence. This signature is comparable to a signature that implies human mental processes occur.)

Notice that any finite collection of standard instructions can be written as one instruction. One more step, application of the realism process (operator) St is applied and a physical universe is formed. The operator St can be considered as a higher-process, where, for finite cases, it corresponds to a definable human mental process. One might state that our universe is formed from entities and processes that correspond to comprehensible processes that we exhibit and, thus, we cannot avoid the evidence. The GGU-model operators are discussed more fully in the article on the Fundamental GGU-model Process listed in the references that you might consult after understanding the major aspects of this article.

I present an illustration for how the instruction-information portion of hyperfinite instruction-information behaves, in general. In this scheme, a basic form of human deduction is illustrated. Let E(i,j) represent a real physical event. Let f(i,j) represent one of the equivalent descriptions for this physical event. For a given f(i,j), let I(i,j) represent the instructions. Notationally, the hyperfinite instruction-set I(i,j) guides the operator G(q,r)(i,j) and this yields an info-field INF(i,j). Then, with the application of the operator St, the corresponding physical event E(i,j) is faithfully produced.

The simple logic displayed in the below illustration is "if given A and the two member set {A,B}, then B is deduced." [{A,B} is but an abbreviation for "If A, then B."] Each connected string of symbols in the following is an "A" or a "B." You can, of course, skip this illustration. The => means "yields."

(1) f(i,j) + {f(i,j),I(i,j)} => I(i,j); I(i,j) + {I(i,j), (St(I(i,j) ->(G(q,r)(i,j))))} => (St(I(i,j) ->(G(q,r)(i,j)))); St(INF(i,j)) = E(i,j).

For the GID-model interpretation, (1) reveals higher-ID-signatures. The processes used to obtain I(i,j), the G(q,r)(i,j) properties and the final St application also reveal higher ID-signatures.2

Since our universe exists, then, in a most general way, indirect evidence indicates that "something" that "behaves" like (1) takes place. What evidence? Every physical object that exists about us and every physical alteration in any of these objects is the evidence. These results can be rationally assumed to be an added feature or refinement that is purposely created so that human beings can deduce, from such sensory-produced descriptions, physical-system properties. Below I'll show that it's these processes and their properties that allow us to build our man-made universe and predict physical behavior. Why not drop the "assumed" and "can be" phrase? Let's state instead, "These rationally obtained results are an added feature or refinement that is purposely created so that human beings deduce, from sensory-produced descriptions, physical-system properties."

The Pure Secular GGU-Model.

How can one describe the "pure secular GGU-model"? Very easily and in but a few sentences. Go the original not refined version of the paper in Herrmann, 2011. What happens is that one need only consider the (i,j)-info-fields as existing. Then substitute throughout the entire model, where the complete I(i,j) appears, the corresponding (i,j)-info-field. Then drop the G(q,r) operator and only apply the St to each (i,j)-info-field as it is generated in order by the *A' operator applied to the resulting only (i,j) varying F(q,r)(i,j). Note that, in the pure (i,j)-info-field case, F(q,r)(i,j) is but considered as a substratum collection of identifiable sets.

Physical Laws.

For our particular universe, I established (Herrmann, 2004) that there exists a linguistic unification U for the collection of physical laws (including physical theories considered as such) as they are accepted by the secular science-communities. Further, the set of all hyper-physical laws *U is predicted to exist. For this section, besides the fact that *U behaves like a hyperfinite logic-system, in what follows, it's considered "operational" in behavior. Now *U is coupled with a special "ultralogic" Pi that corresponds to a internal logic-system (Herrmann, 2001a). This internal logic-system reveals the logical-design for the probabilistic nature of *U. There is no such concept as mere "random" behavior employed by the GGU-model. It is "mindom" behavior, behavior that satisfies the predictions of an hyperfinite logic-system. Notationally, this is written as (Pi*U).

There are actually two collections of physical laws contained in U. Their difference is very significant for any further comprehension of the GGU-model. The first collection corresponds to the physical laws that require physical entities to take on certain patterns, configuration patterns, at any moment (i,j) in the primitive sequence when an info-field becomes physical reality. That is, configurations pattern are represented by each (i,j)-info-field.

The second collection are those physical laws that appear to yield alterations in universe-wide frozen-frames. These lead to the GGU-model notion of pre-design and how the various collections of the entire collections of the (i,j)-info-fields can come about. These are what would generate different universes. For the secular model, one simply assumes that they exist. (The participator model also requires pre-design.) There is a GGU-model process, *A', that selects a collection and it is the selected collection that is realized in physical reality.

Symbolically, it is often the case that additional features need to be understood, features that are not displayed. Let A represent a process. Then the symbol string A(B) is supposed to mean that the process A applies directly to B and produces A(B). In some cases, like the displays below, this is not technically correct. There may be an intervening process between the two that has been symbolically suppressed. The symbol A at the point, where it is expressed as A(B), would, if formalized, be written in the mathematical "composition" form. This suppression is done to bring forth, more clearly, what is the major intuitive relation. It's the one between A and B.

The set {(i,j)} corresponds to a sequence of numbers {k} that perseveres the ordering of the "universe-wide frozen-frames." Each of these frozen-frames is considered as fixed slice of a universe as it sequential develops. For a particular k = (i,j), the collection of hyperfinite instructions that yields an info-field is here denoted by H(k) = {h(q,r))(k)}. Hence, in notational form, a k info-field can be written, using the properton gathering operator, as G(q,r)(k)[H(k)]. To this info-field, the well-defined operator St is applied. Let's consider the corresponding notation for generation of the universe-wide frozen-frame as an event E(k).

The following symbolism is employed. (Pi*U)E(k). Due to its content, this means that "only those physical laws that demand that a specific configuration pattern be maintained are considered as applied. For example, that there needs to be a certain number of electrons associated with a specific number of protons and neutrons and maybe a lot of other stuff to maintain a particular "state" for an subatomic particle. This idea corresponds to a specific k-info-field configuration.

The italics form for E is used since the event need not be entirely physical, it can be physical or physical-like. So we have, in symbolic form that can be read by substituting the names that identify each form,

(G) St(G(q,r)(k)[H(k)]) = E(k).

Obviously, this directly relates each G(q,r)(k)[H(k)] to the E(k). The "next" event E(k +1) can be viewed as satisfying the equation

(G') (Pi*U)E(k) = E(k+1) = St(G(q,r)(k+1)[H(k+1)]).

Again, G(q,r)(k+1)[H(k+1)] is directly related to E(k+1). As viewed by an observer, the *deduction algorithm *A' can be interpreted as a rational hyperfinite transformation of hyperfinite instruction-information represented by {H(k)} into hyperfinite instruction-information representation {H(k+1)} in such a manner that the internal physical laws are preserved. This yields the schemes

(A) *A'[H(k)] = H(k+1),

(B) St(G(q,r)(k+1)([H(k + 1)])) = E(k+1) = (Pi*U)E(k),
(B') St(G(q,r)(k+1)(H(k + 1))) = E'(k+1) = (Pi*U)E'(k),

(C) [H(k + 1)] <==> E(k+1) = (Pi*U)E(k) <==> [H(k)].

(D) G(q,r)(k+1)[H(k + 1))] <==> E(k+1) = (Pi*U)E(k).

Equation (B) is for the generation of a universe-wide frozen-frame E. Equation (B') is for the generation of each physical (or physical-like) system E'. These statements are "formal" mathematical statements. (Pi*U) is actually defined on members of a hyperfinite developmental paradigm that correspond to the E [resp. E']. Further, this scheme represents (Pi*U) restricted in application and applies to members of the [resp. refined] hyperfinite developmental paradigm.

Consider the following secular point of view. (SW) Restricted to an observer's view from within our universe, (C) and (D) associates instruction-information with physical laws. That is, physical laws are fixed and alter instruction-information and its this altered instruction-information that yields each step in the development of a physical-system. In this case, instruction-information is a type of (classical) physical information related to quantum fields. 3 (This doesn't imply that other types of information follow this property.) This allows all of the GGU-model processes to be applied, where they are but considered as substratum "laws." The physical laws are the original cause. They just somehow-or-other exist for some-reason-or-other.

For the GGU-model, the reverse is the case. Physical laws are neither the cause for the formation of physical objects nor alteration in any physical event. What occurs is that the physical laws "satisfy" (B) and (B') and this allows us to predict future behavior from past events. But, there is more to this as I discuss below.

Expression (C) and (D) are rather more important then as used in (SW). They state that the physical laws that we perceive and that we apply, in restricted form, correspond directly, in restricted form, to hyperfinite instruction-information as here characterized. That is, to the restriction to our physical universe of hyper-meaningful thoughts.

Secularists need to ignore the previous questions and answers here proposed for one of the greatest abilities possessed by the human being. They would need to ignore mental processes they themselves have employed many times - processes that lead to their "great" mentally obtained discoveries and the glory that goes along with these discoveries.

Secularists need to accept the rather absurd belief that our mysterious thought processes "have some explanation" based upon claimed evolutionary processes for which absolutely no evidence exists. (Such evidence is even faked by simply inserting those artists conceptions one sees in textbooks and on walls as what our evolutionary development "might have been.")

Can secularists ignore the question, why and how is it that humankind is the only known earthly biological entity that possess these mental abilities? Indeed, we have acquired such mental abilities "on our own," so to speak, without any additional evidence such as the absolute absurdities that this is all a product of some intelligent physical alien entity. (By-the-way, such a notion is rationally absurd since it leads to what is termed as a worthless infinite "logical" regress.)

Secularists need to stop making such statistically absurd statements such as "You see students, it must be that certain biological entities, indeed, very-lower forms like this "creature," by mere chance, had their brains altered. Then, as time went on, a Beethoven and a Mozart, who gave his first recital to royalty at six and wrote his first opera at 11, are born. And isn't it wonderful, that after such a vast period of time when other entities should have developed such abilities by mere chance, Nature has made sure that it has only happened to one type of biological entity - us."

The actual evidence that does exist is that application of the described physical laws requires an intelligent agent. Intelligence is specifically defined via "rational thought." This definition is applicable to biological entities. The definition is NOT dependent upon any description as to "how" the ability to think logically has come into being.

Physical scientists continue to work toward a goal that presents a preponderance of evidence that Nature behaves like an intelligent agent. Thus far, the GGU-model shows that Nature, in all respects, behaves like an intelligent agent. Hence, Nature is an intelligent agent. A preponderance of evidence, indeed every physical thing that exists and every alteration in physical behavior, establishes that Nature, as an intelligent agent, is the restriction of the behavior of a higher-form of intelligence as predicted by the hyperfinite instruction-information model portion of GGU-model.

The PGU-model and Alteration-Information.

In previous versions of this article, I discussed the concept of the PGU-model and alteration-information. This model includes "physical laws" as entities that produce alterations in the development of our universe. But, it does not in any way indicate any additional information as to a mechanism for this purpose. So, I no longer consider this is a viable addition to the GGU-model and have removed it.

Physical Laws, The General Intelligent Design Model (GID) and a Theological Model

One of the original parts of the GGU-problem deals with the notation of the physical laws, but not as previously discussed. How is it possible that physical law cause and effect statements exist in such a manner that we can express them, predict future behavior and construct our man-made universe? I have written a lot about this. The facts are they exist and are observable evidence for intelligent design. Such laws satisfy the step-by-step development of our universe and this indirectly and rationally implies that our universe is pre-designed by an intelligent agent that has incorporated this additional feature into the design.

The GID model is but the immediate intelligent agent and designer interpretation for the complete GGU-model. Above, I have inserted this interpretation many times. Moreover, throughout this article, I've written the phrase, "we may not be able to otherwise comprehend." In most cases, for the secular model, this phrase could just as likely be "we cannot otherwise comprehend." But, for the basic terms "thoughts" and "intrinsic comprehension" as used for substratum behavior, it's possible to relate these to yet another entity and this entity does allow us to have an additional understanding as to what these terms signify. Of course, as is done throughout mathematical modeling, substituting less suggestive terms and ignoring all the intelligent design indications as a superfluous interpretation leads to the complete secular models.

Prior to 7 April 1977 and, in the past and today, atheists reject the obvious. How is this possible? They often use the term "Nature" to refer to "something" that behaviors like "something" but reject the described higher-intelligence "something" that the complete GGU-model now predicts. The GID interpretation directs us to an entity. The characteristics of this entity were describe thousands of years ago. Indeed, the following holds.

Recall that in secular atheistic science, the universe simply exists. If one insists that something has produced our universe, then that something simply exists. The physical laws, the relations between "primitive stuff," simply exist. No further explanations are necessary or even tolerated.

God states that we should simply accept that "He exists." As He puts it, "I am." We are told that God is (invisible) Spirit. Hence, by direct implication, we should simply accept that He is Spirit. In numerous places within the Bible, statements are made that imply that this Spirit has properties that we need to accept as existing. Then Biblical statements imply that these properties behave like what we consider as "thoughts." Hence, God behaves like a mind. However, this behavior is "higher than" the behavior of human thoughts. Our only actual guide to such behavior is how our thoughts behave. This is a viable method since God states specifically that we are "made in His image." In many cases, individuals do not accept these statements on God's existence. Individuals have proposed other non-biblically stated properties for the God concept. Each of these lead to a contraction since these individuals do not know the basic rules for common logic.

Thus, it is immediate that God's "meaningful thoughts" and their transformation into actions does allow additional comprehension when these thoughts are guided by describable logical processes. That is, we can have knowledge of God's behavior relative to creation and His sustaining of the physical world by comparing His behavior to similar behavior exhibited by humankind. Restricted comparisons have been a basic method used throughout the complete GGU-model to enhance comprehension. Of course, such comparisons are only for those attributes that can be compared. God has many attributes that are not so comparable. This establishes the rationality of God's described creationary methods and all present day physical reality is evidence for the existence of these methods. But, as with many aspects of modern physical science, this is indirect physical evidence for the acceptance of this entity as a real object. There is a preponderance of evidence for the acceptance of the Biblical God as the hyper-intelligent agent that created all there was, and creates all there is and all there ever well be.4

As previously described in detail, if "something" essentially behaves like "something," then it is that "something." Relative to physical objects, physical-systems and physical behavior, since Nature essentially behaves like God restricted to the physical world, then it IS God restricted to the physical world.5QED

More Refined Hyperfinite Developmental Paradigm Information - Foreknowledge.

In Biblical theology, the important notion of "foreknowledge" is described via numerous Biblical verses. Can this aspect of God's behavior be successfully argued for, via classical logic, without violating any GGU-model processes? That is, is there a rational "model," of this type, for such behavior? If so, then the concept becomes rationally consistent with physical science and all other aspects of the complete GGU-model. In the extensive article Human Behavior, Foreknowledge and Predestination, such a model is presented. This is a "model" in the specific sense that it yields the appropriate "behavior."


1. Eccles and Robinson discuss physical evidence relative to human thought patterns. They suggest that the only reasonable way to explain such behavior is to postulate the existence of a "thought-medium." This thought-medium does not display itself as an individual physical entity. The physical results attributed to this medium would be how it displays its presence. This is similar to how quantum fields are viewed.

2. Such signatures need not be related to what constitutes an ordinary symbolically expressed signature. For example, consider an unsigned painting. An expert studies the brush strokes, the colors, the canvas, and many other procedures the artist has followed to create the images. He then announces that, in all likelihood, Johanna produced the painting. The investigated features correspond to Johanna's methods and are considered a signature.

3. Faraday introduced the notion of magnetic lines of force. He did not argue for their acceptance as real physical entities in the scientific journals. Maxwell introduced the notation of electromagnetic "things" that need to exist at each space point. This is the classical notion of a physical field. He developed twenty equations (later written in vector form by Heaviside) to predict behavior that is observable. He argued that these "things," this field (or fields), is the best explanation for how this behavior comes about.

The Maxwell field notion is endowed with "particle-like" properties. Poincaré considered "light" as possessing momentum. Unit analysis shows that if Planck's constant h is divided by a length, then the unit of momentum is obtained. Also if h is multiplied by a number that represents some sort of cyclic behavior per sec., then a number in energy units is obtained. Thus one can, at least, endow a field with these two properties. Does this mean that the field somehow or other has fundamental "stuff" that is vibrating? Not if it is a primitive entity since it wouldn't be composed of more fundamental entities. Under specific conditions, such a field is considered as displaying its presence when it manifests photon behavior. The word "manifests" is usually dropped and one states that a "photon" is produced or created.

It's then postulated that what are considered as elementary particles also have wave-like properties. So as to correspond to the field notion for photons, it is postulated that fields carry (somehow) the appropriate particle properties. And, these fields manifest themselves as "particles." The wave properties for electrons, say, predict that they will behavior under certain experimental scenarios like photons. These predictions are verified within a laboratory setting.

Personally, I am a type of "limited positivist." I don't accept the physical existence of such physical fields. I consider the notion as but an analogue model that can be used to predict observable behavior. I do have vast personal experience with the notion of a thought-medium. Something of this nature continues to affect me daily. It has properties modeled by languages and patterns of human thought, such as deduction. These properties predict human behavior. Distinct from physical fields, such patterns of mental behavior have been described by others for thousands of years. If there were only quantum field type evidence, I would not make the following statement. My experience has convinced me that an Eccles and Robinson thought-medium exists.

Further, my experience with a second type of medium that produces miraculous events and the Biblical descriptions for its behavior also yields additional evidence that the medium associated with hyperfinite instruction-information exists.

4. There is no such thing as Natural evil. I present elsewhere how it is that we are inhabits of the present earth. Evil is not what exists and behaves physically, but is rather related to human behavior.

5. This is a special note related to Biblical interpretation. After many years, I should think that those who follow my work in this area would have "figured out" my obvious modeling intent. I reject the idea put forth by some Church Fathers and their Biblical attempts to justify the extremely weak notion that God's thoughts about material creation and the actual physical results of these thoughts are synonymous. When I first constructed the original GGU-model, I was entirely unaware as to how it parallels human behavior and strengths the Biblical statement "So, God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them." (Genesis 1:27.)

Over time, my vague thoughts have become expressible. I have found the words and modern devices that show how God's mode of creation, as Biblically stated, in restricted form, follows our methods for the construction of our man-made universe.

In Genesis 1, the Hebrew 'âmâr is translated at other locations, as "thinking." "Although not always so translated, the word can imply the act of thinking within oneself. (Nelson's Expositor, p. 353.) This is a special Hebrew understanding. I translate it this way in Genesis 1 for the word "said."

The Hebrew 'âsâh has a very wide meaning. In various places, it's translated as "prepares for a 'future' sequential event." The concept of "preparing," except for 1:31, is how I translate the "made" in Genesis 1, at the least, God is "mentally" preparing. This is the hyperfinite developmental paradigm model. For the 1:31, due to the "And God saw," a foreknowledge statement, the "made" means "brought forth" - the physical realization process.

The Hebrew, bârâ' is translated as "creates." In Genesis 1, this indicates to me a sequentially future physical event and I translate it as such. Genesis 2 discusses these physical events in more detail and seems to me to be presented, at least partially, to indicate that Genesis 1 is primarily discussing God's thoughts.

This is the e-mail address for I. M. P. and RAHerrmann..


Eccles, J. and D. N. Robinson. 1984. The Wonder of Being Human: Our Brain and Our Mind. The Free Press, NY.

Feynman, R. 1985. QED The Strange Theory of Light and Matter. Princeton University Press.

Herrmann, R. A. 2013. Biblical Interpretations.

Herrmann, R. A. Fundamental GGU-model Processes. or GGU-model and GID-model Processes

Herrmann, R. A. 2011. Ultra-logic-systems or Nonstandard Ultralogic-logic-systems

Herrmann, R. A. 2006. The rationality of hypothesized immaterial mental processes, Creation Research Society Quarterly, 23(2):62-69.

Herrmann, R. A. 2004. Nonstandard consequence operators generated by mixed logic-systems.

Herrmann, R. A., 2004. The best possible unification for any collection of physical theories, International Journal for Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences, 17:861-872.

Herrmann, R. A. 2001. Hyperfinite and standard unifications for physical theories. International Journal for Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences, 28(2):93-102. For typographical corrections, see the paper archived at

Herrmann, R. A., 2001a. Ultralogics and probability models, International Journal for Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences, 27(5):321-325. Same article but with published corrections to two statements inserted.

Herrmann, R. A. 1999. Encoding quantum state information within propertons

Herrmann, R. A. 1979. The Theory of Ultralogics, Part II

March, A. and I. M Freeman. 1963. The New World of Physics. Vintage Books, N. Y.

Nelson's Expository Dictionary of the Old Testament, (Ed.) M. F. Unger, W. White, Jr. Thomas Nelson Pub., Nashville, USA.

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